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  II.-1 
RUNNING CLEAN: DISCHARGES TO 
GROUNDWATER HYDROLOGICALLY 
CONNECTED TO NAVIGABLE WATERS  
AS A MEANS FOR ASSERTING CLEAN 
WATER ACT JURISDICTION 
Abstract: On September 24, 2018, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Clean Water Network v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
held that the Clean Water Act (CWA) does not apply when a pollutant first trav-
eled a short distance through groundwater before entering a navigable waterway. 
In doing so, the court held only direct discharges into navigable waters are gov-
erned by the CWA. This Comment argues that the Sixth Circuit’s decision runs 
counter to the CWA’s purpose and plain meaning; furthermore, it asserts that the 
Tennessee Clean Water Network decision will hamper the government’s ability to 
hold polluters accountable by opening up a significant loophole in the CWA’s ju-
risdiction. 
INTRODUCTION 
Can polluters avoid triggering jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act 
(CWA) by ending their outflow pipes a couple feet from surface water?1 Accord-
ing to Judge Eric Clay’s dissent, that is exactly what the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit was deciding when it heard Tennessee Clean Water 
Network v. Tennessee Valley Authority.2 On September 24, 2018, the Sixth Cir-
cuit answered the aforementioned question with a resounding yes.3 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn.Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 447–48 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(Clay, J., dissenting), cert. dismissed, 140 S. Ct. 35 (2019) (opening the dissent by posing the ques-
tion, “Can a polluter escape liability under the Clean Water Act . . . by moving its drainage pipes a 
few feet from the riverbank?”); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2018). 
 2 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 447–48. The majority, in contrast, seemingly viewed 
this case as a simple question of federalism; primarily, who has jurisdiction to regulate this pollution: 
the state or the federal government? See id. at 439 (stating that the Clean Water Act (CWA) was de-
signed to “recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, 
reduce, and eliminate pollution [and] to plan the development and use . . . of land and water re-
sources”) (citation omitted). 
 3 See id. at 448 (“In two cases today, the majority says yes.”). In Tennessee Clean Water Net-
work, the Sixth Circuit broke with precedent from the Ninth, Fourth and Second Circuits that the 
CWA covered both direct and indirect discharges into navigable waters. Compare id. at 444 (holding 
pollution that travels through groundwater before entering navigable waters not covered by the CWA), 
with Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 652 (4th Cir. 2018) 
(holding indirect discharges—discharges through an intervening groundwater medium—into naviga-
ble waters constitute a violation of the CWA), Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 
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In Tennessee Clean Water Network, the Sixth Circuit held that CWA ju-
risdiction requires pollutants to be discharged directly from a point source into 
a navigable body of water.4 In making this decision, the Sixth Circuit split 
from contrary precedent in the United States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth 
and Ninth Circuits, which had previously held that pollutants discharged into 
groundwater hydrologically connected to navigable waterways trigger CWA 
jurisdiction.5 This Comment explores the implications and rationale behind the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision.6 
Part I of this Comment examines the factual and procedural background 
of Tennessee Clean Water Network as well as the CWA’s history and hydrolog-
ical connection theory.7 Part II discusses the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Ten-
nessee Clean Water Network as well as the reasoning of the Fourth and Ninth 
Circuits in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P. and Ha-
waii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui.8 Finally, Part III argues that the Sixth 
Circuit incorrectly read into the CWA a directness requirement that runs coun-
ter to the plain meaning, history, and purpose of the CWA, and therefore, the 
Supreme Court should avoid adopting the Sixth Circuit’s rationale when it de-
cides Hawaii Wildlife Fund.9 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S TENNESSEE CLEAN WATER 
NETWORK DECISION AND THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Congress enacted the CWA of 1972 with the objective of “restor[ing] and 
maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s 
                                                                                                                           
(9th Cir. 2018) (same), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019), Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 
F.3d 486, 510–11 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that discharges through an intervening land medium violate 
the CWA), Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(same), and Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cty., 600 F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
discharges from a point source that travel through intervening air to water still violate the CWA). On 
the same day the Sixth Circuit decided Tennessee Clean Water Network, the court released a nearly 
identical opinion involving a similar case: Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co. Ky. 
Waterways All. v. Ky. Utilities Co., 905 F.3d 925, 925 (6th Cir. 2018). In Kentucky Waterways Alli-
ance, the court also considered if pollution carried by groundwater from a coal ash impoundment to a 
nearby body of surface water triggered the CWA. Id. at 930–31. 
 4 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (“[Tennessee Valley Authority] is discharging 
pollutants into the groundwater and the groundwater is adding pollutants to the Cumberland River. 
But groundwater is not a point source. Thus, when the pollutants are discharged to the river, they are 
not coming from a point source; they are coming from groundwater which is a nonpoint-source con-
veyance. The CWA has no say over that conduct.” (quotation omitted)). 
 5 Compare id. (finding no CWA jurisdiction), with Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652 (deciding 
that pollution that travels a short distance through groundwater prior to entering navigable waters does 
not defeat CWA jurisdiction), and Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 (same). 
 6 See infra notes 10–102 and accompanying text. 
 7 See infra notes 10–43 and accompanying text. 
 8 See infra notes 44–75 and accompanying text. 
 9 See infra notes 76–102 and accompanying text. 
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waters.”10 In order to achieve this purpose, Congress established the goal of 
eliminating all discharges of pollutants.11 To facilitate this, Congress included 
a citizen suit provision in the CWA that authorizes citizens to bring civil ac-
tions against any alleged violator of the CWA so long as the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) or an applicable state agency is not prosecuting the 
entity for the alleged violations.12 
In 2015, two environmental groups brought a claim under the citizen suit 
provision alleging that the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) violated the 
CWA at a coal-fired power plant the agency operated in Gallatin, Tennessee.13 
                                                                                                                           
 10 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). By the time Congress passed the CWA, a wide-spread frustration with the 
inadequacy of previous efforts to protect the nation’s waterways from pollution already existed. See S. 
REP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3675. High profile incidents such as 
the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio in 1969 helped spark a national movement to clean up Ameri-
ca’s waters. See Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of the Burning River, 45 Years Later, WASH. POST 
(June 22, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/22/the-fable-
of-the-burning-river-45-years-later/ [https://perma.cc/KKU8-NB45] (noting that the Cuyahoga River 
fire exemplified the environmental dangers facing the United States in the 1960s); Tim Folger, The 
Cuyahoga River Caught Fire 50 Years Ago. It Inspired a Movement., NAT’L GEO. (June 21, 2019), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/2019/06/the-cuyahoga-river-caught-fire-it-inspired-
a-movement/#close [https://perma.cc/MKF6-ERNA] (stating that the Cuyahoga River fire inspired 
environmentalists to act). 
 11 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a)(1)–(2). Unlike some legislative purposes, which contain high sounding 
language that the drafters never returned to in the act, the CWA contains a fail-safe provision which 
allows the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set higher standards in 
regions where the normal effluent limitations would not facilitate achievement of Congress’s objec-
tives. See id. § 1312 (“Whenever, in the judgment of the Administrator . . . , discharges of pollutants 
from a point source or group of point sources . . . would interfere with the attainment or maintenance 
of that water quality . . . effluent limitations (including alternative effluent control strategies) for such 
point source or sources shall be established which can reasonably be expected to contribute to the 
attainment or maintenance of such water quality.”). 
 12 Id. § 1365(a)–(b); see also Justin Rheingold, Comment, Digging Deep: The Clean Water Act’s 
Applicability to Groundwater Discharges, 60 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. II.-311, II.-311–12 (2019) (dis-
cussing the role played by citizen suits in facilitating enforcement of the CWA). Additionally, a citi-
zen suit can be brought against the Administrator of the EPA for failure to perform a non-
discretionary duty imposed by the statute. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2). As a matter of procedure, a plaintiff 
must give sixty days notice to the EPA Administrator, the state in which the alleged violation occurs, 
and the alleged violator before filing a citizen suit. Id. § 1365(b)(1). 
 13 Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 273 F. Supp. 3d 775, 781 (M.D. Tenn. 
2017), rev’d 905 F.3d 436. The plaintiffs in this case were the Tennessee Clean Water Network, a 
non-profit advocating for water protection programs in Tennessee, and Tennessee Scenic Rivers As-
sociation, a non-profit organization dedicated to the conservation and rehabilitation of Tennessee 
rivers. See Mission and History, TENN. CLEAN WATER NETWORK, https://www.tcwn.org/mission-
history [https://perma.cc/TTQ7-BMSZ]; About Us, TENN. SCENIC RIVERS ASS’N, http://www.paddle
tsra.org/home/about [https://perma.cc/V4E9-XSND]. Because both organizations had members who 
used and enjoyed the Old Hickory Lake portion of the Cumberland River, which the Gallatin Plant 
was alleged to have polluted, the organizations had standing to sue on behalf of their members. See 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) (holding 
environmental groups have standing to sue under the CWA’s citizen suit provision if at least some of 
their individual members have standing to sue); Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 441 (noting 
that members of both organizations made use of Old Hickory Lake). 
II.-4 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
Specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that the Gallatin Plant’s coal ash impound-
ments were polluting the Cumberland River through hydrologically connected 
groundwater.14 Section A of this Part reviews the factual background and pro-
cedural history of the Tennessee Clean Water Network v. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority litigation.15 Section B reviews the CWA’s background, purpose, and 
key definitions, as well as the hydrological connection theory.16 
A. Factual Background and Procedural History  
of Tennessee Clean Water Network 
In 1956, the TVA began operating the Gallatin Plant, a coal-fired power 
plant, located along the bank of Old Hickory Lake, a reservoir formed out of 
the Cumberland River in Sumner County, Tennessee.17 The TVA disposed of 
coal combustion residual (CCR) from the Gallatin Plant at a 65-acre surface 
impoundment, identified as the Non-Registered Site (NRS), from 1956 until 
the NRS’s closure in 1970.18 From 1970 to the present, CCR has been stored in 
the Ash Pond Complex (the Complex), which is roughly 476 acres.19 Both the 
NRS and the Complex are unlined impoundments.20 The entire Gallatin Plant 
                                                                                                                           
 14 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 441. 
 15 See infra notes 17–28 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 29–43 and accompanying text. 
 17 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 784. 
 18 Id. at 785. Coal combustion residual (CCR) refers to the various types of ash produced during 
the burning of coal. Frequent Questions About the 2015 Coal Ash Disposal Rule, EPA, https://www.
epa.gov/coalash/frequent-questions-about-2015-coal-ash-disposal-rule [https://perma.cc/D8BV-NAN3]. 
CCR contains heavy metals, some of which are carcinogenic, including mercury, cadmium, and arse-
nic. See id. The disposal process used at the Gallatin Plant is called “sluicing.” Tenn. Clean Water 
Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 785. Sluicing refers to the mixing of CCR with water, in order to ease 
transport into impoundments where the CCR settles out and the water eventually evaporates or is 
discharged. Frequent Questions About the 2015 Coal Ash Disposal Rule, supra; see also Tenn. Clean 
Water Network, 905 F.3d at 438 (discussing that the Gallatin Plant’s coal ash disposal process in-
volved “allowing the coal ash solids to settle in a series of unlined man-made coal ash ponds adjacent 
to the river”). 
 19 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 785. CCR is either stored in landfills or, as 
occurred at the Gallatin Plant, in surface impoundments. Id.; see Frequent Questions About the 2015 
Coal Ash Disposal Rule, supra note 18 (“In 2012, approximately 40 percent of the CCRs generated 
were beneficially used, with the remaining 60 percent disposed in surface impoundments and landfills. 
Of that 60 percent, approximately 80 percent was disposed in on-site disposal units. CCR disposal 
currently occurs at more than 310 active on-site landfills, averaging more than 120 acres in size with 
an average depth of over 40 feet, and at more than 735 active on-site surface impoundments, averag-
ing more than 50 acres in size with an average depth of 20 feet.”). 
 20 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 785. An impoundment is a man-made or natural 
reservoir used for storing liquid hazardous waste. See Hazardous Waste Management Facilities and 
Units, EPA [hereinafter EPA, Hazardous Waste Management], https://www.epa.gov/hwpermitting/
hazardous-waste-management-facilities-and-units#surfaceimpoundments [https://perma.cc/ZEN5-
YQP]. The fact that the Gallatin Plant’s impoundments were unlined means that they lacked an im-
permeable man-made liner designed to prevent CCR from entering the groundwater. Tenn. Clean 
2020] Hydrological Connection Theory and Clean Water Act Jurisdiction II.-5 
and both CCR impoundments are located on karst geological features, meaning 
that the land is characterized by porous limestone “with sinking streams, shal-
low bedrock, and sinkholes.”21 
On November 10, 2014, the plaintiffs, concerned about the water quality in 
Old Hickory Lake, informed the TVA, the Tennessee Department of Environ-
ment and Conservation (TDEC), and the EPA that they intended to file a citizen 
suit alleging multiple violations of the CWA at the Gallatin Plant.22 Subsequent-
ly, on April 14, 2015, the plaintiffs filed their Complaint in the United States 
District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee.23 Ultimately, because the 
TDEC began an enforcement action against the TVA, the court dismissed the 
claims with the exception of those related to pollution in the Cumberland River 
caused by groundwater discharges from the NRS and the Complex.24 
The court held a four-day bench trial that ended on February 2, 2017.25 
The district court found that the TVA violated the CWA at the Gallatin Plant 
because the NRS and the Complex leaked pollutants without a permit through 
groundwater that is hydrologically connected to the Cumberland River.26 
The defendants appealed and argued the district court erred in holding 
that the CWA applies to pollutants that travel from point sources to navigable 
waters through groundwater.27 In a divided decision, the Sixth Circuit reversed 
the districts court’s opinion, holding that no basis in the law exists to support 
CWA jurisdiction when discharges indirectly enter navigable waterways.28 
                                                                                                                           
Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 785; see EPA, Hazardous Waste Management, supra (stating that 
required liners are meant to stop leaks). 
 21 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 785; see Karst Landscapes, NAT’L PARK SERV., 
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/caves/karst-landscapes.htm [https://perma.cc/P54L-95W3] (“Karst is a 
type of landscape where the dissolving of the bedrock has created sinkholes, sinking streams, caves, 
springs, and other characteristic features. Karst is associated with soluble rock types such as lime-
stone, marble, and gypsum.”). 
 22 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 786. The CWA authorizes citizens to file civil 
actions enforcing the Act so long as they notify the alleged violator, the Administrator of the EPA, 
and the State where the violation occurred of their intention to sue sixty days before filing the action. 
33 U.S.C § 1365. 
 23 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 273 F. Supp. 3d at 786. 
 24 See id. at 786–87 (“The Court also dismissed the remaining claims except as they applied to 
two sets of allegations: ‘discharges from the Non-Registered Site into the Cumberland River; and 
discharges from the Ash Pond Complex via hydrologic flows that are not seeps alone.’”). 
 25 Id. at 787. 
 26 See id. at 836, 842 (finding that, due to the karst topography of the region, water polluted with 
CCR from NRS and the Complex migrated through ground waters into the Cumberland River). The 
CWA requires that anyone discharging pollution into a waterway obtain a National Pollutant Dis-
charge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. An NPDES permit lays out the condi-
tions under which discharges may occur. Id.; see infra notes 30–31 and accompanying text (discussing 
NPDES permits). 
 27 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 442 (clarifying that the defendants asserted that such 
indirect discharges were not subject to the CWA, and could only be regulated by the states). 
 28 Id. at 443. 
II.-6 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
B. The Clean Water Act and Hydrological Connection Theory 
The CWA’s enactment marked a departure from previous congressional 
efforts to clean up the nation’s waterways.29 Under the statute, all entities—
corporations, individuals, and municipalities—wishing to discharge pollutants 
into a waterway must obtain a permit under the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES).30 NPDES permits require the implementation 
of the best available technology in order to reach specific limits on the dis-
charge of various contaminants.31 
The Act defines the phrase “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”32 Therefore, to have 
a claim under the CWA, a pollutant must be discharged from a point source to 
navigable waters.33 Under the CWA, “pollutants” are defined broadly to in-
clude all sorts of chemical and physical items that could contaminate water-
ways.34 A “point source” includes any identifiable and unique source of pollu-
                                                                                                                           
 29 See S. REP. NO. 92-414 (shifting the focus of federal regulatory efforts from measuring excess 
pollution levels in the waterways to limiting the amount of pollution a given entity could discharge); 
see also N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How the 1972 Act 
Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, 4 GEO. WASH. J. ENER-
GY & ENVTL. L. 80, 87 (2013) (discussing the congressional objective of improving water quality and 
public health in light of frustration with the limited success of the Water Quality Improvement Act 
during the 1950s and 60s). In addition to establishing the goal of “restor[ing] and maintain[ing] the 
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters,” the CWA made it a national goal 
to eliminate the discharge of pollutants by 1985 and established an interim goal of water quality suita-
ble for fishing and recreation by mid-1983. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1251(a)(1)–(2). 
 30 33 U.S.C. § 1342; see id. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with this section and sections 
1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person 
shall be unlawful.”); id. § 1362(5) (defining person as “an individual, corporation, partnership, associ-
ation, State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body”). 
 31 Id. § 1311(b)(1)–(2) (instructing that the EPA Administrator implement effluent limitations 
based on “best practicable control technology” for the pollutant or the “best available technology 
economically achievable”); see also Antonio G. Fraone, Shucking a Patent: How a Simple Best Avail-
able Technology Law Can Break the Shell of Patent Protections, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1049, 1074–76 
(2018) (providing an in-depth discussion of how best available technology laws function). 
 32 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). 
 33 See Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 165 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (holding that to have 
a claim under the CWA, “(1) pollutants must be (2) added (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point 
source”). 
 34 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). A pollutant includes “dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, 
sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materi-
als, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agri-
cultural waste discharged into water.” Id. This definition does not include “sewage from vessels or a 
discharge incidental to the normal operation of a vessel of the Armed Forces” or “water, gas, or other 
material which is injected into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas, or water derived in associa-
tion with oil or gas production and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production 
or for disposal purposes is approved by authority of the State in which the well is located, and if such 
State determines that such injection or disposal will not result in the degradation of ground or surface 
water resources.” Id. 
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tion.35 Finally, the term “navigable waters” is a statutory term of art defined as 
“the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas.”36 
It is well established that the CWA does not regulate groundwater; there-
fore, discharges to groundwater do not violate the Act.37 Groundwater, howev-
er, is often a source of surface water, and the hydrological connections between 
these types of waterbodies allow pollution to migrate from groundwater to sur-
face water.38 For this reason, courts increasingly grapple with whether to bring 
groundwater under the purview of the CWA in instances where a pollutant is 
discharged from a point source but passes through groundwater before entering 
a navigable waterway.39 Federal courts that have found CWA violations in such 
situations have done so on the basis of a hydrological connection between the 
                                                                                                                           
 35 Id. § 1362(14). A “point source” is defined as “any discernible, confined and discrete convey-
ance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, con-
tainer, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from 
which pollutants are or may be discharged.” Id. Non-point sources such as “agricultural stormwater 
discharges” are exempted from federal regulation. Id. Instead, the CWA relies on states to regulate 
non-point source pollution. Id. § 1329. 
 36 Id. § 1362(7). Traditionally, navigable waters have only included those interstate waters that 
are “navigable in fact.” See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 723 (2006) (plurality opinion) 
(quoting The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870)). In United States v. Riverside Bayview 
Homes, Inc., however, the Supreme Court expanded the definition of waters of the United States to 
include a wetland adjacent to a body of navigable water. 474 U.S. 121, 131 (1985). The Supreme 
Court concluded that when Congress adopted an alternative definition of navigable waters it “intended 
to repudiate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pollution control statutes 
and to exercise its powers under the Commerce Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not 
be deemed ‘navigable’ under the classical understanding of that term.” Id. at 133. Since then, the exact 
scope of what constitutes the “waters of the United States” has been a contentious question that has 
remained unsettled in the courts and various administrations. Compare Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 
(concluding that “navigable waters” refers only to those “permanent, standing or continuously flowing 
bodies of water”), and Revised Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4155 
(Feb. 14, 2019) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 122, 230, 
232, 300, 302 & 401) (same), with Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (stating that to 
be covered by the CWA, the waters need only have a “significant nexus” to some navigable water-
way), and Clean Water Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. 37,054, 
37,054–55 (June 29, 2015) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 
122, 230, 232, 300, 302 & 401) (same). Although this dispute is largely outside the scope of this 
Comment, it is clear is that “waters of the United States” does not include groundwater. Clean Water 
Rule: Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 80 Fed. Reg. at 37,055; Revised Definition of “Wa-
ters of the United States,” 84 Fed. Reg. at 4155. 
 37 Kathrine Klaus, Note, The Conduit Theory: Protecting Navigable Waters from Discharges to 
Tributary Groundwater, 43 VT. L. REV. 871, 872 (2019). 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 877–81 (discussing three theories for establishing CWA jurisdiction over discharges to 
tributary groundwater: the point source theory, the navigable waters theory, and the conduit theory). 
As the name describes, “‘point source theory’ asserts that groundwater is itself a point source.” Id. at 
878. Navigable water theory argues that groundwater is a “jurisdictional navigable” water of the Unit-
ed States. Id. at 879. Meanwhile the conduit theory claims that groundwater, due to hydrological con-
nections with surface water, acts as a conduit that transports pollution to a navigable waterway. Id. at 
880–81. 
II.-8 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
ground water and navigable surface water.40 This rationale, known as the “hy-
drological connection theory,” is premised on the Supreme Court’s plurality 
opinion in Rapanos v. United States, holding that the CWA’s definition of a 
discharge of a pollutant does not require a discharge directly into navigable 
waters.41 In 2018, however, the Sixth Circuit rejected the hydrological connec-
tion theory and in doing so split with the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.42 In order 
to resolve this split, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to Hawaii Wildlife 
Fund v. County of Maui, an appeal from the Ninth Circuit decision, and will 
hear the case during the 2019–2020 term.43 
II. LEGAL CONTEXT OF THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN  
TENNESSEE CLEAN WATER NETWORK 
When the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that dis-
charges into hydrologically connected ground water were not subject to the 
CWA, the court rejected the rationale previously employed by the United States 
Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and Ninth Circuits.44 Section A of this Part dis-
cusses the analysis undertaken by the Sixth Circuit in Tennessee Clean Water 
Network v. Tennessee Valley Authority.45 Section B discusses the Fourth and 
Ninth Circuits’ approach in Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, 
L.P. and Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui. 46 
                                                                                                                           
 40 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652 (holding that discharges of pollution into groundwater 
that are then carried a short distance to surface water constitute a violation of the CWA); Haw. Wild-
life Fund, 886 F.3d at 749 (same). 
 41 Rapanos, 547 U.S. 743; e.g., Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649 (relying on Justice Scalia’s 
plurality opinion in Rapanos to conclude that the CWA applies to indirect discharges to navigable 
waterways); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 748–49 (same). 
 42 Compare Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 438, and Ky. Waterways, 905 F.3d at 933, 
with Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652, and Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 749. 
 43 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d 737. Petitions for writs of certiorari were also filed from the 
decisions of the Fourth and Sixth Circuits. Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d 637, petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. Aug. 28, 2018) (No. 18-268); Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d 436, petition for cert. filed, 
(U.S. Apr. 15, 2019) (No. 18-1307). 
 44 Compare Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 444 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(concluding that the CWA is only triggered by direct discharges into surface water), with Upstate 
Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 652 (4th Cir. 2018) (concluding the 
CWA is triggered when pollution reaches surface water, even if that pollution was first discharged 
into groundwater), and Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. 
granted, 139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (same). See generally Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2018). 
 45 See infra notes 47–62 and accompanying text. 
 46 See infra notes 63–75 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Sixth Circuit’s Rationale for Rejecting  
Hydrological Connection Theory 
In determining whether discharges of pollutants into groundwater hydro-
logically connected to surface water constituted a violation of the CWA, the 
Sixth Circuit considered the CWA’s language and construction.47 The Sixth 
Circuit’s textual analysis relied on: (1) the statutory definition of “effluent lim-
itations” and (2) the CWA’s jurisdictional requirement that pollutants be added 
to waterways “from” a point source.48 Based on this analysis, the court con-
cluded that the CWA mandates an element of directness.49 Additionally, the 
court concluded that Rapanos v. United States was irrelevant to the case at 
hand.50 
First, in reviewing the district court’s finding that the TVA violated the 
CWA when the Gallatin Plant’s coal ash ponds discharged pollutants into 
groundwater hydrologically connected to the Cumberland River, the court 
looked to the definition of “effluent limitations.”51 The CWA defines effluent 
limitations as the maximum amount of a pollutant allowed to be “discharged 
from point sources into navigable waters.”52 The court concluded that for a 
point source to discharge “into navigable waters,” the pollutant cannot travel 
                                                                                                                           
 47 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 442, 445. Because this Comment is focused on 
whether hydrological connection theory is valid under the CWA, it will not discuss the Sixth Circuit’s 
conclusion that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) also prevented CWA jurisdic-
tion in the instant case. Id. at 445–46. This holding, however, should not be considered settled law as 
this interpretation directly conflicts with the EPA’s interpretation of the statute. See 40 C.F.R. 
§ 261.4(a)(2) (2019) (determining CCR is regulated under both the RCRA and the CWA, with the 
CWA becoming applicable the moment CCR is discharged into navigable waters). 
 48 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444. 
 49 See id. (holding that direct contamination from a point source to a surface waterway is required 
for CWA jurisdiction). 
 50 Id. at 444–45. In Rapanos v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the scope of “waters 
of the United States” under the CWA. 547 U.S. 715, 739 (2006). Writing for the plurality, Justice 
Scalia concluded that “from the time of the CWA’s enactment, lower courts have held that the dis-
charge into intermittent channels of any pollutant that naturally washes downstream likely violates 
§ 1311(a), even if the pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered 
waters, but pass ‘through conveyances’ in between.” Id. at 743. The plaintiffs and the lower court used 
Justice Scalia’s decision to support the idea that indirect discharges were captured by the CWA and 
that, therefore, the Sixth Circuit needed to responded to this potentially contradictory precedent. See 
Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (noting that the plaintiffs relied on an irrelevant non-
binding statement by Justice Scalia to support their arguments). 
 51 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444. The court referred to effluent limitations as “the 
heart of the CWA’s regulatory power” because they are the federally prescribed restrictions on a given 
industry’s ability to pollute. Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (providing that effluent limitations constitute 
the maximum amount of a pollutant that can be discharged from a point source). The CWA requires 
the EPA Administrator to set effluent limitations as part of the NPDES. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. 
 52 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (“The term ‘effluent limitation’ means any restriction established by a 
State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, 
and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters of 
the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance.”). 
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through some other medium; it must leave a point source and go “directly” into 
a CWA jurisdictional water.53 
Next, to further augment its conclusion that pollutants must be added di-
rectly to waterways for the CWA to apply, the Sixth Circuit turned to the defi-
nition for “discharge of a pollutant,” which entails the addition of a pollutant to 
a navigable waterway “from any point source.”54 The court determined that, 
because the coal ash was first discharged to ground water and then migrated to 
the Cumberland River, the pollutants were not coming “from” a point source, 
but rather “from” the groundwater.55 Therefore, the court concluded the coal 
ash discharge was not a direct discharge actionable under the CWA.56 
Finally, the Sixth Circuit addressed why its decision was not in conflict 
with the Supreme Court’s plurality opinion from the Rapanos case.57 The 
Ninth Circuit and the Fourth Circuit held that pollutants traveling through hy-
drologically connected groundwater constituted grounds for CWA liability 
based, in large part, on the plurality opinion in Rapanos.58 The Sixth Circuit, 
however, concluded that the plurality decision was not on-point and binding 
because the case dealt with a different legal issue.59 The court determined that 
supporters of hydrological connection theory misunderstood Justice Scalia’s 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444. The court justified this interpretation based on 
the definition of “into” in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary and the Oxford English Dic-
tionary, which define it as “entry, introduction, insertion” and “[e]xpressing motion to a position with-
in a space or thing: [t]o point within the limits of; to the interior of; so as to enter,” respectively. Id.; 
see Into, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2018) (“entry, introduction, 
insertion”); Into, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/74884 [https://
perma.cc/B8QD-DY2D] (“Expressing motion to a position within a space or thing: [t]o point within 
the limits of; to the interior of; so as to enter.”). 
 54 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (“The term ‘discharge of a pollutant’ and the term ‘discharge of 
pollutants’ each means (A) any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source, 
(B) any addition of any pollutant to the waters of the contiguous zone or the ocean from any point 
source other than a vessel or other floating craft.”). 
 55 See Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (“TVA is discharging pollutants into the 
groundwater and the groundwater is adding pollutants to the Cumberland River. But groundwater is 
not a point source. Thus, when the pollutants are discharged to the river, they are not coming from a 
point source; they are coming from groundwater which is a nonpoint-source conveyance. The CWA 
has no say over that conduct.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. at 444–45. See generally Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 719 (noting that three other justices joined 
Justice Scalia’s opinion). 
 58 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649 (discussing plurality opinion in Rapanos); Haw. Wildlife 
Fund, 886 F.3d at 748–49 (finding support from Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion for holding that no 
directness requirement exists in the CWA). 
 59 See Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444–45 (interpreting Rapanos as having addressed 
the scope of waters of the United States and not whether pollution reaching a river via groundwater trig-
gered the CWA); see also Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 739 (concluding that “waters of the United States in-
cludes only those relatively permanent standing or continuously flowing bodies of water,” and not those 
which only occasionally divert rainfall). 
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discussion concerning the absence of a directness requirement in the CWA.60 
According to the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, the Rapanos plurality only addressed 
pollutants that traveled through multiple point sources before being discharged, 
not pollutants that were discharged and then traveled through an intervening me-
dium.61 The groundwater in this case was an intervening medium and not a point 
source in and of itself; therefore, CWA jurisdiction could not be asserted.62 
B. The Fourth and Ninth Circuits’ Rationale for Upholding  
Hydrological Connection Theory 
In reaching its decision in Tennessee Clean Water Network, the Sixth Cir-
cuit rejected the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in Upstate Forever and 
the Ninth Circuit in Hawaii Wildlife Fund.63 In Upstate Forever, the Fourth 
Circuit held that CWA jurisdiction existed even though the pollution—oil re-
leased by a ruptured pipeline—traveled through groundwater before seeping 
into a nearby river.64 In Hawaii Wildlife Fund, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision holding the County of Maui liable under the CWA for 
discharging sewage from groundwater wells into the Pacific Ocean.65 In reach-
ing their respective decisions, the Fourth and Ninth Circuits found support for 
their holdings in the text of the CWA.66 Additionally, both Circuits relied on 
precedent and the Fourth Circuit looked to congressional purpose in enacting 
the CWA.67 
Both Circuits began their analyses with the text of the CWA.68 The courts 
pointed to 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A) to demonstrate that the CWA’s plain lan-
guage requires only that a pollutant originate at a point source and reach navi-
                                                                                                                           
 60 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444. 
 61 See id. at 445 (“[W]hen Justice Scalia pointed out the absence of the word directly from 
§ 1362(12)(A), he did so to explain that pollutants which travel through multiple point sources before 
discharging into navigable waters are still covered by the CWA.”) (quotations and citations omitted). 
 62 See id. (“Justice Scalia’s reference to ‘conveyances’—the CWA’s definition of a point source—
reveals his true concern. He sought to make clear that intermediary point sources do not break the chain 
of CWA liability; the opinion says nothing of point-source-to-nonpoint-source dumping like that at issue 
here.”) (citations omitted). 
 63 Compare id. at 438, with Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652, and Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d 
at 749. 
 64 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 641. 
 65 Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 742. 
 66 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650; Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 744. 
 67 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649–52 (concluding that allowing groundwater to defeat 
CWA jurisdiction is contrary to Congress’s “zero-tolerance” approach to water pollution); Haw. Wild-
life Fund, 886 F.3d at 746–48 (citing to Supreme Court and Second Circuit precedent on whether 
indirect discharges are governed by the CWA). 
 68 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650; Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 744. Both circuits focused 
their analyses on 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A), which defines the “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addi-
tion of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)(A); Upstate 
Forever, 887 F.3d at 650; Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 744. 
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gable waters in order to trigger regulations.69 According to the courts, the Su-
preme Court decision in Rapanos, as well as precedent from the Second Cir-
cuit, supports this reading.70 The courts followed the plurality opinion in Ra-
panos, which held that the CWA contains no directness requirement and 
acknowledged that federal courts have historically held polluters liable under 
the CWA when their discharges naturally washed downstream.71 Similarly, the 
courts employed the rationale developed by the Second Circuit in earlier cas-
es—Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk County, Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. 
EPA, and Concerned Area Residents for the Environment v. Southview Farm—
to support the proposition that the CWA captures indirect discharges into navi-
gable waterways.72 These cases from the Second Circuit held that the CWA 
regulates pollution that travels through a non-point source (such as the air or a 
field) before entering a navigable waterway.73 
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit concluded that allowing polluters to escape 
liability for indirect discharges would run counter to Congress’ intent in pass-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650 (“The plain language of the CWA requires only that a 
discharge come ‘from’ a ‘point source.’ Just as the CWA’s definition of a discharge of a pollutant 
does not require a discharge directly to navigable waters . . . neither does the Act require a discharge 
directly from a point source. The word ‘from’ indicates ‘a starting point: as (1) a point or place where 
an actual physical movement . . . has its beginning.’”) (citations omitted); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 
F.3d at 744 (“As the pollutants here enter navigable waters and can be traced back to identifiable 
points of discharge, the wells are subject to NPDES regulation, as are all point sources under the plain 
language of the CWA.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 70 Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649–51; Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 746–48. 
 71 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 649–50 (stating that, based on Rapanos, the pollutants need 
not enter navigable water directly from point sources); Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 748 (“[I]n 
Rapanos v. United States, Justice Scalia recognized . . . that ‘any pollutant that naturally washes 
downstream likely violates § 1311(a), even if the pollutants discharged from a point source do not 
emit “directly into” covered waters, but pass “through conveyances” in between.’”) (citations omit-
ted). 
 72 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 650; Haw. Wildlife Fund, 886 F.3d at 747–48. In Waterkeep-
er Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, the Second Circuit held that if courts required both the cause of the pollution 
and any intervening land to qualify as point sources, such an interpretation would, in practice, “impose 
a requirement not contemplated by the Act: that pollutants be channelized not once but twice before 
the EPA can regulate them.” 399 F.3d 486, 510–11 (2d Cir. 2005); see also Concerned Area Residents 
for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that liquid manure that passed 
from tankers through intervening fields to nearby waters constituted a discharge from a point source). 
The Second Circuit further recognized the indirect discharge theory in Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. 
Suffolk Cty., where it rejected the district court’s conclusion that “because the trucks and helicopters 
discharged pesticides into the air, any discharge was indirect, and thus not from a point source.” 600 
F.3d 180, 188 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 73 See Peconic Baykeeper, Inc., 600 F.3d at 188 (holding that discharges into the air were still 
actionable under the CWA); Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., 399 F.3d at 510–11 (ruling that unchanneled 
runoff from concentrated animal feeding operation were regulated by the CWA); Concerned Area 
Residents for Env’t, 34 F.3d at 119 (concluding manure dumped on a field and washed to a stream 
was a discharge of a pollutant under the CWA). 
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ing the CWA.74 The CWA makes all unpermitted discharges to navigable wa-
ters illegal; therefore, the court concluded that allowing some discharges simp-
ly because they first passed through an intervening medium would be contrary 
to congressional intent.75 
III. THE SIXTH CIRCUIT IGNORED PLAIN MEANING AND CONGRESSIONAL 
PURPOSE IN DISMISSING HYDROLOGICAL CONNECTION THEORY 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Tennessee Clean Water 
Network v. Tennessee Valley Authority undermines the CWA’s ability to protect 
the nation’s waterways by opening up a new loophole which will allow those 
who pollute to escape liability.76 The court’s decision lacks support from either 
the plain meaning of the statute, precedent, or congressional purpose.77 There-
fore, as the Supreme Court decides Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, it 
should refrain from adopting the rationale that the Sixth Circuit employed.78 
A basic tenet of statutory interpretation is that Congress does not attempt 
to hide changes to regulatory regimes in obscure definitional provisions.79 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Upstate Forever, 887 F.3d at 652 (stating that allowing Kinder Morgan to escape CWA 
liability would run counter to the purpose of the Act). 
 75 See id. (“[T]he statute establishes a regime of zero tolerance for unpermitted discharges of 
pollutants, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). In contrast, if the presence of a short distance of soil and ground wa-
ter were enough to defeat a claim, polluters easily could avoid liability under the CWA by ensuring 
that all discharges pass through soil and ground water before reaching navigable waters. Such an out-
come would greatly undermine the purpose of the Act.”); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“Except as in 
compliance with this section and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, and 1344 of this title, the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”). 
 76 See Tenn. Clean Water Network v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 905 F.3d 436, 448–49 (6th Cir. 2018) 
(Clay, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that the majority’s decision allows polluters to escape CWA 
liability by reducing the length of their outflow pipe so that pollution travels a few feet through soil 
before entering a navigable body of water); see also Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 
(2018). If the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of the CWA is adopted nationally, countless prior court 
decisions protecting waterways would be invalidated; for example, a plane could discharge pollution 
over rivers or lakes without triggering the CWA because the pollution traveled through the air (a non-
point source) before reaching the water. See, e.g., Peconic Baykeeper, Inc. v. Suffolk Cty., 600 F.3d 
180, 188 (2d Cir. 2010) (noting that pesticides sprayed through the air travel through an intervening 
medium). 
 77 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 743 (2006) (concluding that Congress, in writing 
the CWA, did not include a requirement that discharges travel directly from a point source into navi-
gable waters); Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (laying out a core 
tenet of statutory interpretation); Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 450–51 (Clay, J., dissent-
ing) (objecting to the majority’s reading of the CWA as improperly focusing on the wrong provisions 
of the statute). 
 78 Compare Haw. Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737, 749 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 
139 S. Ct. 1164 (2019) (holding indirect discharges to navigable waters to be governed by the CWA), 
with Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444 (holding only direct discharges to navigable water 
trigger the CWA). 
 79 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (“Congress, we have held, does not alter the fundamental details of a 
regulatory scheme in vague terms or ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants 
in mouseholes.”). 
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Courts have routinely refused to uphold agency interpretations of statutes that 
use small provisions to fundamentally alter the scope of an act.80 It was there-
fore unreasonable for the court to conclude that Congress meant for the CWA 
to contain a previously missed directness requirement, based on the inclusion 
of the word “into” in the definition of “effluent limitations.”81 
Furthermore, despite the Sixth Circuit’s claims to the contrary, the word 
“into” is not found in any provision relevant to this case.82 Instead of the defi-
nition of effluent limitation, the court should have analyzed the definition of 
“effluent standard or limitation,” which the CWA defines as “an unlawful act 
under subsection (a) of section 1311 of this title.”83 Had the court considered 
the more relevant text, it would have been left parsing the definition of “to” 
instead of “into.”84 “To” definitively lacks the directness of “into.”85 
The court also used the appearance of the word “from” in the definition of 
“discharge of a pollutant” to impart a directness requirement.86 This explana-
tion is a little strained, however, as it defies the dictionary understanding of the 
word “from,” which in common usage would denote a starting point or a 
source.87 Based on its plain meaning, a point source is the place from which 
                                                                                                                           
 80 See, e.g., Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 
(2000) (holding that Congress did not covertly grant the FDA authority to regulate the sale of tobacco 
products); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 (1994) (determining that 
an agency’s power to “modify” does not give it the power to render voluntary what Congress made 
mandatory). 
 81 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468 (concluding that key changes to the statutory regime are not 
surreptitiously inserted into the obscure sections of an act); Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 
451 (Clay, J., dissenting) (“Congress did not hide a massive regulatory loophole in its use of the word 
‘into.’”). 
 82 See Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 451 (Clay, J., dissenting) (explaining that the 
citizen suit provision, under which this action was brought, includes the phrase “effluent standard or 
limitation” and not “effluent limitation”). “Effluent standard or limitation” is distinguishable from 
“effluent limitation” because the citizen suit provision defines the former as “an unlawful act under 
subsection (a) of section 1311 of this title.” 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f); id. § 1362(11). 
 83 33 U.S.C. § 1365(f). 
 84 See id. § 1311(a) (declaring that “the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlaw-
ful”). The “discharge of a pollutant” is defined as “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters 
from any point source.” Id. § 1362(12)(A) (emphasis added). 
 85 See To, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/202695 [https://
perma.cc/DZ8F-TSWK] (“Expressing motion directed towards and reaching: governing a noun denot-
ing the place, thing, or person approached and reached.”); see supra note 53 (discussing the meaning 
of “into”). 
 86 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 444. 
 87 See From, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
from [https://perma.cc/DL5W-XVLX] (“[U]sed as a function word to indicate a starting point of a 
physical movement . . . .”); From, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/
74884 [https://perma.cc/65XR-8GKB] (“[I]ndicates a point of departure or place whence motion takes 
place.”); From, THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, https://ahdictionary.com/word/search.html?
q=from [https://perma.cc/L6KW-QJBY] (defining “from” as indicating a starting point, source, or 
cause). 
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pollution originates; but, no requirement exists that the discharge exit the point 
source and flow immediately into navigable waters.88 
Likewise, the court’s attempt to distinguish Tennessee Clean Water Net-
work from Rapanos is unconvincing at best.89 As the dissent rightly indicated, 
although the facts were different, the legal issues were identical in both cas-
es.90 Additionally, in Rapanos, Justice Scalia voiced support for the long-
standing practice of district courts holding polluters responsible under the 
CWA when they discharge indirectly into navigable waters.91 
This practice of applying the CWA to indirect discharges is further sup-
ported by the whole act rule.92 The whole act rule is a doctrine of statutory in-
terpretation establishing that the language of a statutory provision should be 
interpreted, not in isolation, but rather in the context of the entire act.93 The 
CWA defines a point source as including, among other things, a “well.”94 Any-
thing discharged from a well would, by design, enter groundwater before en-
tering surface water.95 Therefore, if wells constitute point sources, Congress 
must have intended the CWA to regulate discharges into groundwater that sub-
                                                                                                                           
 88 See Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 650 (4th Cir. 
2018) (“Under this plain meaning, a point source is the starting point or cause of a discharge under the 
CWA, but that starting point need not also convey the discharge directly to navigable waters.”). 
 89 See Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 445 (concluding that the Rapanos plurality’s 
conclusion that no directness requirement exists in the CWA only applies to pollutants that travel 
through multiple point sources). 
 90 See id. at 452 (Clay, J., dissenting) (stating that both cases assessed whether the CWA applied 
when pollution traversed additional mediums after leaving its original point source). 
 91 See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 743 (“[F]rom the time of the CWA’s enactment, lower courts have held 
that the discharge . . . of any pollutant that naturally washes downstream likely violates § 1311(a), even if 
the pollutants discharged from a point source do not emit ‘directly into’ covered waters, but pass 
‘through conveyances’ in between.”). In fact, Justice Scalia cited a Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
case, Concerned Area Residents for Environment v. Southview Farm, from which hydrological con-
nection theory draws considerable influence because it stands for the proposition that pollutants which 
enter a waterway indirectly, after passing through an intervening medium, are still discharges under 
the CWA. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 744; Concerned Area Residents for Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 
F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding manure that enters a nearby waterway after being dumped onto 
a field by a tanker is governed by the CWA). 
 92 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGU-
LATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 675–76 (5th ed. 2014) (defining the whole 
act rule as the strategy of interpreting statutory provisions in light of the entire act). The whole act rule 
has been an integral part of Supreme Court statutory interpretation jurisprudence. Id.; see United Sav. 
Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Ass’ns., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“Statutory construction 
. . . is a holistic endeavor.”); Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (“When interpreting a 
statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but 
will take in connection with it the whole statute . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 93 ESKRIDGE, supra note 92, at 675–76. 
 94 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); see also id. § 1362(6) (exempting discharges into oil and gas extraction 
wells from the definition of pollutants). 
 95 See Groundwater Wells, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SERV., https://www.usgs.gov/special-topic/water-
science-school/science/groundwater-wells?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects 
[https://perma.cc/VBY5-HUYW] (describing the types and functions of wells). 
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sequently migrate to navigable waterways.96 By holding otherwise, the Sixth 
Circuit effectively interpreted the CWA’s definition of effluent limitations in a 
way that directly conflicts with the definition of a point source.97 
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit’s decision is contrary to Congress’s purpose 
in passing the CWA.98 In Tennessee Clean Water Network’s companion opin-
ion, Kentucky Waterways Alliance v. Kentucky Utilities Co., the Sixth Circuit 
condemned its sister circuit courts for relying on the CWA’s statutory purpose 
when adopting the hydrological connection theory, claiming that such reliance 
is a method of “last resort.”99 Even if that claim were true, it would not excuse 
the Sixth Circuit’s utter disregard for the CWA’s purpose.100 Congress set clear 
goals for eliminating pollution from the nation’s waterways and gave the Ad-
ministrator of the EPA explicit powers to achieve that vision; the congressional 
purpose, in short, does not constitute a mere nicety.101 As it currently stands, 
those who wish to avoid CWA liability in the Sixth Circuit need only discharge 
their pollutants first into groundwater or through the air, which is a far cry 
from Congress’s aim to restore and maintain the nation’s waters.102 
                                                                                                                           
 96 See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (defining a point source as “including but not limited to any pipe, 
ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal 
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged”) 
(emphasis added); ESKRIDGE, supra note 92, at 679 (explaining that it is inappropriate to interpret one 
provision of a statute in a manner that would create a conflict with another provision); see also Robin-
son v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 345–46 (1997) (concluding the definition of “employee” includes 
former employees, because excluding them from the class of protected people would impair Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act’s anti-retaliation provision). 
 97 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 92, at 679 (noting that an essential element of the whole act rule is 
the rule against interpreting a provision in derogation of other provisions, which essentially means that 
courts should not read one part of a statute in a manner that would abrogate another section of the 
statute); supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s interpretation of 
effluent limitations). 
 98 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (providing that the explicit statutory purpose of the CWA is to “restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”). The court’s 
decision undermines Congress’s purpose by creating an opening for polluters to escape responsibility 
for contaminating the nation’s waters by ensuring their discharge first passes through some non-point 
source medium before reaching a navigable waterway. See Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 
449, 452 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
 99 Ky. Waterways All. v. Ky. Utilities Co., 905 F.3d 925, 937 (6th Cir. 2018). 
 100 Tenn. Clean Water Network, 905 F.3d at 449, 452 (Clay, J., dissenting); see supra notes 74–75 
and accompanying text (describing the purpose of the CWA). 
 101 See supra notes 10–11 and accompanying text (explaining the context and rationale for con-
gressional enactment of the CWA). 
 102 See Ky. Waterways All., 905 F.3d at 933 (holding that groundwater cannot be a conveyance 
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pull of gravity”). The majority’s opinion would allow a polluter to spray pollutants through the air into 
Lake Michigan. Id. at 942 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in Tennessee Clean Water 
Network v. Tennessee Valley Authority created a significant loophole by barring 
CWA liability if a pollutant travels first through groundwater, or potentially 
any other diffuse medium, before entering a navigable body of water. Congress 
enacted the CWA with the express goal of eliminating all discharges of pollu-
tion to navigable waterways. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits accurately as-
sessed that the plain language of the CWA creates no requirement that pollu-
tion flow immediately from a point source directly into a navigable waterway. 
Furthermore, the Ninth and Fourth Circuits’ conclusions are consistent with 
precedent from the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit. The Sixth Circuit’s 
rejection of the theory that CWA liability exists when pollutants travel a short 
distance through hydrologically connected groundwater to navigable water-
ways ignores the purpose of the CWA, while misconstruing CWA precedent 
and the Act’s plain meaning. Therefore, as the Supreme Court prepares to rule 
on Hawaii Wildlife Fund v. County of Maui, it should refuse to adopt Sixth 
Circuit’s misguided interpretation. 
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